If short term results were the only objective of shareholders then all shareholders would, over time, gravitate to the optimal short-term stocks. This does not happen thus is demonstrably not true.

Furthermore, if all shareholders only desire short term benefit, then speculative, growth and infrastructure stocks would not exist - and they do.

A discussion that universally categorises shareholders into one benefits camp over another is incorrect because we know from observation and research, that different shareholders want different outcomes and the same shareholder may require different benefits from different stocks. If that were not the case, then fund managers would be largely out of a job.

The only way to resolve the challenge of aligning the corporate endeavours with the desired outcomes of its owners is to establish its shareholder objectives (metrics) in quantifiable terms against the criteria of value, benefit, growth and risk. Management (and the board) are then judged on their ability to achieve those metrics - regardless of whether they are short, medium or long term.

Although shareholders should provide both positive and negative feedback, the reality is that the majority of shareholders are unlikely to make the effort. That does not mean they don't care about outcomes - they do - that's why they put down real money into the company.

The problem, in my humble opinion, is not with shareholder inaction, but with boards and directors. The for-profit corporation exists for the benefit of shareholders while satisfying legal and stakeholder requirements. If that is the case, then why is it that not one single publicly listed board has asked all of its shareholders what they want as a result of their investment?

You are right that shareholders have differing expectations. However, if you establish a company's shareholder metrics, (i.e. bell-shaped curve - value, benefit, growth and risk expectations) then the range of shareholder expectations prior to establishing those metrics will be wider than post-metrics. If you monitor the changing shareholder objectives over time, it will enable a much better match between corporate aspirations and owner aspirations. This is because people will invest in those companies that "share" their objectives, i.e. the company will pursue those outcomes that the majority of its shareholders want, therefore you will invest in those companies that want what you want. Over time, the outliers diminish.

The challenge for both the board and management is to resolve the dilemma of different objectives and perceptions in a way that satisfies the owners. Currently, both board and management establish a policy and a direction for their company without a real knowledge of their shareholders’ objectives.
The Shareholder Metrics process provides them with better information but does not absolve them of their responsibility or accountability.

Where they perform the task well, and satisfy many/most shareholders, then those shareholders will value that stock more highly and are less likely to quit the registry. Conversely, where board and management fail to satisfy shareholders then they will quit the registry, change the board, or change management. Isn't that the ultimate assessment of whether shareholder approve or disapprove of management performance?

These three options are currently available to shareholders (albeit some more easily achieved than others).

Over time however, it is anticipated that it will become easier for the board and management of a shareholder-centric company to solve the above dilemma, as the Investor Profile will ensure that extreme mismatches between differing owner objectives will occur less frequently.

Finally, and for whatever it's worth, I don't believe that shareholders trust directors and managers, even if they concede that both are well meaning and try to do their best. The trust is lost because of director and management subjectivity, bias, assumptions and arrogance.

The "only performance report" that matters is the one that reports to shareholders the extent that the corporation has lawfully and ethically delivered shareholder objectives against the criteria of "value", "benefit", "growth" and "risk".

And the only way a board can know what those objectives are is to ask ALL shareholders.

Not only don't corporations ask ALL shareholders but they use institutional (big investor) objectives as a proxy for all shareholders. Research has demonstrated that this assumption is false.

If you ask directors/managers to developed an internally generated performance report, then you will get a subjective presentation of what suits directors and managers and justifies their positions - and not what shareholders consider important or want.

A cynical view - perhaps - but many directors have demonstrated over an over again that they make decisions in their own interest rather than that of shareholders.