It largely depends on:


1) whether the entity being controlled is a listed corporation or not?

2) who is concerned about the influence of the "controlling" shareholder?

Strictly speaking, the shareholders (controlling or not) should determine corporate outcomes (using the principles of Shareholder Metrics - i.e. find out what the shareholders want and focus the corporation on delivering those outcomes against the dimensions of value, benefit, growth and risk.) This of course is if you accept the Property view of the corporation (i.e. the organisation is owned by its shareholders and all that the corporation does is for the benefit of those shareholders.)

In that context, the CEO is being paid to satisfy shareholders so if he/she is the one upset by the controlling shareholders' focus, then he/she needs to reconcile his/her relationship with those shareholders and understand the principles of Agency Theory (and practice).

If the entities who are "upset" are other shareholders, then they should meet with the controlling shareholder to determine areas of common ambition (i.e. corporate outcomes) and reconcile any differences.

If it is the board that is having a problem with the controlling shareholder, then 1) same comments apply as for the CEO; and 2) the board should undertake a Shareholder Metrics assessment to identify the corporate outcomes expected by all shareholders. If those expectations differ from the controlling shareholder, then remedial strategies (and probably a whole lot of two-way communication) may be required. The board will, with Shareholder Metrics, be able to mount an argument that it has an obligation to all shareholders and not just the controlling shareholder. Without the metrics, it just becomes a game of testosterone and power.